Keep calm on the northern
border
The northern
border, which had been relatively quiet since the Israel Defense
Forces withdrew from southern Lebanon last May, has been troubled
again in recent weeks. The nearly daily stone-throwing routine at
Fatma Gate and other points of friction along the border was
disrupted by the Hezbollah's kidnapping of three IDF combat
engineers three weeks ago. This was followed by the kidnapping of an
Israeli citizen, by an attempt by a group of Palestinian guerrillas
to penetrate Israel, and increasingly worrisome signs that a renewed
series of attacks is imminent.
In his decision to pull the
IDF out of the security zone in southern Lebanon without a political
agreement safeguarding the northern border, and with the collapse of
the South Lebanon Army, Prime Minister Ehud Barak was hoping that
peace would be brought to the Galilee. This hope was based on the
assumption that the Hezbollah would cease its war against Israel
following the withdrawal because it would no longer hold on to the
claim that its actions were aimed at an occupying army. It was also
believed that as a result of the withdrawal Hezbollah would
concentrate on strengthening its political base inside
Lebanon.
Israel sought to comply with international
guidelines and receive the United Nation's confirmation that it had
fulfilled the withdrawal requirements dictated in Security Council
resolution 425, even when this meant giving up positions
topographically better suited for defense because they were situated
several meters inside Lebanon.
Barak backed Israel's
adherence to the UN resolutions by warning that any attack on Israel
following the withdrawal would trigger harsh reprisals. His warnings
were viewed by the other side as credible; many in Israel believed,
for several months, that the right mix of efficient deterrence and
international recognition was achieved.
The Israeli hopes
began to fade with the outbreak of the violence in the territories.
Israel's priorities were altered by the situation: No longer did it
maintain its ominous warnings on the northern front, but sought to
prevent the violent confrontation in the territories from spilling
over into the rest of the Arab world.
Trying to avoid a
broader conflagration, Barak showed restraint, knowing full well
that one of the Hezbollah's aims was to drag the region into a
general war. This same consideration remains a priority as the
second month of violence begins. However, there is a growing sense
that Israel's restraint is bolstering the Hezbollah's resolve. The
more attacks take place, the greater the chances that Israel may
fall in the Hezbollah trap.
Theoretically, the initiative is
with the other side. If the Hezbollah wishes, it will initiate
kidnappings, shooting incidents and attempts to penetrate the
border, and if it so desires it will limit its activities to
demonstrations by protesters at the fence. Israel's ability to
influence the course of events, or control the price it may pay for
the attacks, seems limited.
In order to avoid a destructive
chain of events in the future, it is necessary to embark on
diplomatic efforts with those who can influence the Hezbollah,
mainly Syrian President Bashar Assad, who is
not showing the caution which characterized his late father's
policies. Israel needs to act through any available source, and at
the highest levels, in order to clarify to Assad the serious
implications of the Hezbollah's continued operations. Leaders such
as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and King Abdullah of Jordan,
who have an interest in maintaining stability in the region, and of
course the U.S. President and the European Union, are essential to
this effort.
 
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